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Abstract
The growing consensus that human intelligence
and artificial intelligence are complementary has led
to Human-AI hybrid systems. As digital platforms
incorporating human-AI hybrids, platform designers
need to evaluate the influence of AI on human
judgment, and how such hybrid systems perform. In
this paper, we investigate: Are human decisions
influenced by AI agents in high uncertainty
environments, such as evaluating ICO projects?
Under what situations are humans able to mitigate AI
agents-induced errors? Our results suggest that in
general, humans are influenced by AI agents.
Humans tend to use AI as a filter to rule out low
quality projects, while a high AI rating triggers
human expert to apply their own judgment.

1. Introduction
With the advancing of Artificial Intelligence (AI)
technology, human AI hybrid systems are
increasingly been used in various industries, such as
health care, finance, e-commerce, politics and
government, and much more (Fethi and Pasiouras
2010 [1], Esteva et al. 2017 [2], Leachman and
Merlino 2017) [3]. However, research has yet to
understand how these systems perform, and how
humans may be influenced by AI agents. The
spectrum of the involvement of AI in the completion
of a task can range from task augmentation, task
assemblage, to task substitution (Constantinides
2019) [4]. In this paper, we are interested in
understanding how do AI agents influence human
decision making in an AI augmented system?
We focus on a context where the uncertainty is
high, and the decision making is complex – the
evaluation of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO). ICO is a
fundraising mechanism by which startup companies
sell crypto tokens in exchange for traditional fiat
currency. We collected data from a leading ICO
evaluation platform, where an AI agent first evaluates
and rates ICOs based on an algorithm that takes into
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consideration observable and quantitative properties
of the ICO. After this, human experts evaluate the
ICO and provide their ratings.
The return from investing in the ICO tokens
depends on the eventual success of the projects,
which depends on a myriad of factors; some of them
are readily observable, while many other aspects such
as vision and potential are not easily quantifiable.
While AI algorithm can effectively collect
information and perform consistently without the
influence of emotions or biases, humans possess tacit
knowledge that cannot be explicitly explained,
especially in evaluating aspects like vision or
potential. However, there is little empirical evidence
on how human experts incorporate AI agent
assessments into their decision making. In this paper,
we are interested in understanding the following
research questions. Is human decision making
influenced by AI agents in a human-AI hybrid system
in high-risk environments with high-failure
probability? Does this depend upon whether the AI
agent predicts success or failure?
Our analysis finds that overall, human experts
are influenced by the AI agent. When the AI agent
rates a project low, human expert are likely to align
with the agent. In contrast, when the AI agent rates a
project high, human expert do not blindly follow it.
Taken together, this suggests that in the context of
high failure rate of the ICOs, human experts use the
AI agent as a filter, quickly rejecting projects rated
low by the agent, delving deeper into projects rated
high. Essentially, we found a combination of
algorithm appreciation (Logg et al. 2019) [5] and
algorithm aversion (Dietvorst and Bharti 2019) [6] in
this context, where the AI agent poses an asymmetric
anchoring effect on humans. Finally, our analysis
shows that overall, the hybrid human expert and AI
system outperforms AI agent alone.
We propose that the AI recommendations have
an asymmetric anchoring effect on humans, where
humans use AI agent as a filter, and pay more
attention to the riskier recommendations (or rare
events).
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2. Prior theory and research
2.1. Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is defined as the
“ability of a machine to perform cognitive functions
that we associate with human minds” (Rai et al.
2019) [7]. A non-exhaustive list of the abilities
possessed by AI is the abilities to sense, comprehend,
act and learn (Bawack et al. 2019) [8]. The advantage
of using AI agents for accomplishing tasks (such as
speed, accuracy, reliability, scalability), complement
and extend human competencies such as creativity,
empathy and judgment (Rai et al. 2019) [7]. The
spectrum of involvement of AI in the completion of a
task can range from task augmentation to task
assemblage, to task substitution (Constantinides
2019) [4]. Firms are beginning to recognize the
ability of AI and humans to complement each other,
and are beginning to deploy human-AI hybrid
processes, which are intelligent systems where of AI
agents and human agents work together.
Our focus in this study is on task augmentation.
A recent study by Microsoft suggests that 67% of
business leaders and 64% of workers believe that AI
will augment their work and not displace them,
enabling them to do their existing jobs better or
reduce repetitive task. (Raisch and Krakowski 2020)
[8] argue that organizations adopting a broader
perspective comprising both automation and
augmentation can achieve complementarities that
benefit business and society. However, few studies
have investigated the dynamics between human and
AI in an AI augmented task context. Our paper is
among the first to provide insights on how humans
and AI can complement each other in completing
complex tasks.

2.2. Influence of AI on Decision Making
With the increasing capabilities and applications
of AI (Fethi and Pasiouras 2010, Esteva et al. 2017,
Leachman and Merlino 2017), firms are beginning to
implement AI in decision making. For example,
(Edwards et al. 2000) conducted an analysis of AI for
business decision making at three organizational
decision making levels, i.e. strategic, tactical and
operational decisions. Their findings show that: AI
can be used to replace human decision makers for
structured or semi-structured decisions, but it would
be better to be used as a decision support tool for
dealing with unstructured decisions at the strategic
level in organizations. As the progress of AI
technology enables researchers to create advanced
machines, it is possible for AI to undertake more
complex tasks that require cognitive capabilities such
as making tacit judgments, sensing emotion and

driving processes which previously seemed
impossible (Mahroof 22019).
Researchers have also presented a range of
observations (Logg et al. 2019) regarding how
humans react to advice from AI based systems in a
decision-making context (Dietvorst and Bharti 2019;
Dietvorst et al. 2015; Dietvorst et al. 2018).For
instance, recent work by Dietvorst et al. (2018)
provides empirical evidence to anecdotal references
(Frick 2015; Harrell 2016) which suggest that people
choose their own judgment over algorithm forecasts.
This phenomen2on, termed as algorithm aversion
(Dietvorst et al. 2015) embodies human bias against
algorithmic advice, despite their established
superiority in outperforming human effectiveness
(Dawes et al. 1989; Grove et al. 2000).
This aversion to algorithmic advice is
particularly salient in contexts when the task outcome
is incentivized, such as investing (Dietvorst et al.
2018). Environments which involve high irreducible
uncertainty (such as healthcare or medicine) are most
likely to elicit algorithm aversion where individual
willingness to use algorithms is exacerbated due to
the need for outcome precision (Dietvorst and Bharti
2019). However, the ability to modify the outcomes
seems to alleviate human aversion to algorithmic
advice, highlighting their desire for control over
outcomes, particularly in an incentivized context
(Dietvorst et al. 2018). Algorithm aversion is also
influenced by individuals’ own expertise in decision
making, and wanes when people lack expertise,
leading to the contrasting phenomenon termed as
algorithm appreciation, which motivates individuals
to choose algorithmic advice over a human experts’
(Logg et al. 2019). Our study adds to this stream of
research by understanding how humans make
decisions in volatile markets after being exposed to
the decisions made the AI agent. Insights from our
study shed light on important considerations for
platform designers aiming to use human-AI hybrid
models for complex evaluation tasks.

3. Theoretical background and hypothesis
development
In this study, we examine how assessments made
by an AI agent influence the judgments of human
experts in their evaluations of Initial Coin Offerings
(ICOs). In our context, the platform AI agent assesses
and assigns a rating to each ICO as soon as it is
published on the platform. This rating is based on an
algorithm that takes into consideration observable
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and quantitative criteria of the ICO. All experts see
the agent rating for an ICO before they rate the ICO.
When AI agent evaluates ICOs, there are
generally two types of assessments: either the agent
deems that the ICO project does not have the
potential to succeed in the long run, and thus
provides a low rating, or the agent classifies an ICO
project as high quality, and hence gives it a high
rating. In the ICO market, there is high likelihood of
project failure and fraud, combined with the
possibility of gaining extreme returns from a small
number of projects. This particular context may lead
people to react differently to these two types of
evaluations.
We first consider the case where the agent rates a
project low. Prospect theory suggests that people are
generally loss averse (Kahneman and Tversky 2013)
—individuals assess their loss and gain perspectives
in an asymmetric manner, the pain of loss a certain
amount of money is more pronounced than the
pleasure of gaining the same amount of money. For
example, for some individuals, the pain from losing
$1000 could only be compensated by the pleasure of
earning $2000.Therefore, in a highly risky market
where the probability of gain is very low, and
investments in most projects will end up being losses,
experts are likely to be more risk adverse and put
high weight on low AI agent ratings. In this situation,
AI agent’s low rating may have an "anchoring effect"
on the experts (Strack and Mussweiler 1997; Tversky
and Kahneman 1974), conditioning them to focus on
the potential loss of the investment.
The task of evaluating an ICO is complex. The
true potential of an ICO depends on a myriad of
factors and is extremely difficult to gauge, even for
domain experts.ICO teams know significantly more
about their offering than evaluators, inducing
information asymmetry. The ICO platform has
designed the AI agent to provide an assessment of
each ICO based on an array of observable
information. The intent is that the AI agent will offer
an expert opinion that is unbiased. Of course, the
accuracy of the agent’s assessment is an empirical
question, but it is advertised as a reliable resource to
facilitate the human experts and investors. Therefore,
a risk adverse human expert who has access to the
agent’s assessment should integrate its low rating into
their own analysis processes. Banerjee explains that
there is a rationale for agents to take considerations
of prior agents’ evaluations, because these other
decision makers may have some information that the
agents do not have(Banerjee 1992). In our context for
example, if human experts believe that the AI agent
is reasonably good at collecting information, then the
human experts are likely to be influenced by the

agent. Thus, it is likely that the risk averse experts
will put more weight on AI agent’s low rating and
treat it as a signal of potential risk and give a low
rating following the AI agent. Therefore:
H1: When an AI agent provides a low rating to
a project, subsequent human ratings are positively
related to the AI agent’s ratings.
Consider the case in which the agent gives a high
rating. As discussed earlier, the high failure rate in
the ICO market is common knowledge in the
community (Rhue 2018), thus investors and experts
are likely to be risk adverse. Also well-known is the
fact that the AI agent can only incorporate objective
and observable criteria into its assessment. Taken
together, these two reasons increase humans’
skepticism of high agent ratings. This skepticism
steers human experts away from the inclination to
passively align with the agent’s judgment when the
agent suggests an ICO project is worthy of
investment, instead the skepticism motivates human
experts to analyze such projects critically. Human
experts on the platform have limited time and
resources, and they choose to invest these resources
into analyzing the projects that pass the agent test. In
other words, humans may tend to use to the agent as
a filter and consider only projects that pass through
this filter worthy of detailed and critical examination.
When applied carefully, human judgment is
valuable because of the ability of humans to reason in
a way that goes beyond executing rote calculations
on available data (McAfee and Bynjolfsson 2017).
As opposed to “explicit knowledge”, which is formal,
codified and can be readily explained, humans
possess “tacit knowledge”, the kind of knowledge we
are often not aware we have, and is therefore difficult
to transfer to a machine (Polanyi 1958). “We can
know more than we can tell”, which came to be
known as Polanyi’s paradox (Polanyi 1966), captures
the fact that we tacitly know a lot about the way the
world works, yet aren’t able to explicitly describe this
knowledge. This tacit knowledge of human experts in
the ICO market allows them to take into
consideration sev22eral intangible aspects of the
project such as the v2ision, innovativeness and
potential, which are not accounted for in the agent’s
evaluation. We therefore expect that humans will
critically examine these projects and agree with the
agent only when they believe that the agent’s
evaluation is correct even after applying their own
tacit knowledge. Critical examination will enable
humans to detect spurious cases of high agent ratings
and they are likely to disagree with the agent in these
cases. Therefore:
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H2.When an AI agent provides a low rating to a
project, subsequent human ratings are not related to
the AI agent’s ratings.
Our context represents a particular type of
system where humans are exposed to AI outputs
before making decisions. Such systems have wide
applications, such as helping physicians make
diagnosis, or recommending product and services in
e-commerce. In such systems, humans are aware of
the odds of an event happening, in our case, an ICO
project succeed in the long run, which is low.
Therefore, a rational human would infer this is a
high-risk context and one should be more cautious.
Thus, when AI recommends investing in a project,
careful evaluations based not only on observable
information, but also based on tacit knowledge is
needed. In contrast, when AI agent rates a project
poorly, it is very possible that the project does not
meet certain basic criteria. Given that AI is more
efficient in collecting and analyzing objective
information than human, the low rating would be a
worth considering signal of low quality. Hence, in
such systems, it is possible for humans to combine
the strengths of both human and AI intelligence to
achieve a better overall decision making. Therefore,
we hypothesis:
H3: Humans AI augmented systems can make
better decisions than AI agents alone.
Another interesting question that stems from our
hypotheses is when and why humans deviate from
the AI agent in their evaluations? In other words,
what do human experts focus on or take into
consideration when they make independent
evaluations? Do these factors depend on whether the
AI agent’s evaluation was favorable or unfavorable?
And more importantly, when do these considerations
help them make better decisions? We explore these
questions in post-hoc analyses by taking a deeper
look at the content of the reviews written by human
experts.

4. Method
4.1. Research Context
Following related research in the ICO context
(Bourveau et al. 2018), our data is collected from
ICObench.com, which is one of the most prominent
and comprehensive ICO reviewing and rating
platform (Note that, the actual process of fund raising
is not performed in ICObench.com or other rating
sites). On ICObench.com, ICO teams promote their
projects with a pitching video, white paper,
descriptions of the projects and other related financial
and team member information. Once a project is

posted, the AI agent of the platform will provide a
rating for the project. Then, a community of experts
(people who are experienced and active in the ICO
community) will provide reviews and ratings for
these projects. Using these insights, investors can
choose promising ICOs to invest.
The platform displays the data of each ICO on
three tabs. First, on the main page, ICO project
related information is provided comprising a brief
introduction, the project pitch, and the goals of the
project. It also includes other details such as the
token type, value of token in ICO, ICO soft cap, hard
cap. The AI agent rating is presented on this main
tab. Second, the ratings tab displays the experts’
reviews and ratings of the ICO and links to the
profile page of each expert who rated the ICO. Third,
the Team tab lists the profiles of the ICO team
members.
Each ICO project receives two types of ratings,
one by the AI agent of this platform, popularly
known as Benchy, and the second by experts, who
are active members of the ICO Bench community
and experienced domain experts. The Agent uses an
algorithm taking into inputs of a number of objective
and observable parameters to evaluate each of the
ICO projects. The agent evaluates each ICO on 4
major dimensions, namely, Team, ICO Information,
Product Presentation and Marketing & Social Media.
The human experts on the other hand provide a more
subjective and qualitative evaluation. Each human
expert provides a rating on a scale of 1 to 5 on three
broad categories: Team, Vision and Product. Apart
from the ratings the human experts also provide a
textual review explaining their evaluations.

4.2. Data
We collected data of 2783 ICO projects, from
January 2017 to December 2018. For each project,
we collected individual expert ratings and reviews,
the date the rating was provided, as well as ICO
project data. Some of our dependent, independent and
control variables were available in the data set, while
others were constructed for the analysis. The
descriptive statistics for these variables are presented
in table 1.
Dependent Variable
Expert Rating is an average rating on a scale of 1
to 5 given to an ICO project by each individual
human expert based on three primary parameters of
team, vision and product. It has a mean of 3.79 and a
standard deviation of 0.584 and the distribution of the
ratings is positively skewed. The distribution of the
expert rating is presented in figure 1.
Independent Variable
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Agent Rating is the evaluation provided at the
beginning by the artificial agent to each of the ICO
projects. It has a mean of 3.71 and a standard
deviation of 0.632 showing the agent is more
conservative in its overall evaluations. The
distribution of the agent rating is presented in figure
2. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the difference
between expert ratings and agent rating.
Control Variables
PreICO is a binary variable, which indicates
whether the projects have a Pre-ICO fund raising
period prior to the official ICO.
Price in ICO is measured as the value of each token
in US Dollars sold during the ICO stage.
Distributed in ICO is measured as the percentage of
the token that will be distributed during the ICO.
Softcap is the minimum amount of funding an ICO
project team aims to raise during the ICO. Here
Softcap is a categorical variable with the values of 0,
1 or 2, where if the softcap information is not
available on the icobench website, the whitepaper
and the project website, then it is coded as 0. If the
value of softcap is between 0 and 50 percentile then it
is coded as 1, and if the softcap is higher than 50
percentile, it is coded as 2.
Hardcap is the maximum amount of funding an ICO
team will accept during the ICO. Once the hard cap is
reached, no future funding from investors will be
accepted. Hardcap is a categorical variable, defined
as 0, 1 or 2, where if the hardcap information is not
available on the icobench website, the whitepaper
and the project website, then it is coded as 0. If the
value of softcap is below the 50thpercentile, it is
coded as 1, and 2 otherwise.
Success is a proxy for the quality of the project and
potential to be successful. Prior research has used
whether a token sold during ICO was successfully
listed on exchanges after the ICO, and whether the
ICO achieved its softcap, and amount raised in ICO
to measure the success of ICO projects (Bourveau et
al. 2018; Lee et al. 2019; Li et al. 2019; Lyandres et
al. 2019). We use whether the ICO token is trading at
a non-zero value one year after the ICO (considering
if a token is successfully listed in an exchange and
continued trading for one year) to measure the ICO
project success.
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Expert Rating

3.79

0.584

0

5

Agent Rating

3.71

0.632

1.7

5

PreICO

0.65

0.477

0

1

Price in ICO

0.134

0.205

0

2.762

Distributed in ICO

0.418

0.297

0

1

Softcap

0.637

0.673

0

2

Hardcap

1.231

0.844

0

2

Success

0.179

0.383

0

1

Figure 1. Histogram of expert ratings

Figure 2. Histogram of agent ratings

Figure 3. Histogram of (Expert Ratings –
Agent Rating)

5. Analysis
In Table 2, we share our preliminary analysis
where we regress the expert rating on agent rating.
The results reveal a positive relationship between
agent ratings and expert ratings while controlling for
ICO project characteristics (0.437, p<0.001).
Table 2. Linear Regression of effect of agent
rating on expert ratings
Agent Rating
PreICO
Price in ICO

ExpertRating
0.437***
(0.014)
0.068***
(0.019)
-0.016
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(0.044)
0.101***
(0.030)
0.018
(0.014)
0.012
(0.011)
2.117***
(0.058)

Distributed in ICO
Soft Cap
Hard Cap
Intercept

Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
However, the positive relationship between agent
ratings and expert ratings could simply mean that
both the bots and the experts happen to be correct (or
incorrect) in their respective judgments of ICOs due
to unobserved variables. The regression above does
not allow us to make casual inferences about the
effect that agent ratings have on expert ratings.
Below, we share the challenges and our empirical
strategies in examining whether agent ratings
influence expert ratings. In particular, following prior
literature, we use the system GMM model to address
the issue of endogeneity of our dependent variable,
Expert Rating, by using transformed regressors as
valid instruments (Ghose and Han 2011, Li and Wu
2018Aral, Brynjolfsson and Van Alstyne 2012,
Yoganarasimhan 2012, and Sonier, McAlister and
Rutz2011).
5.2. Econometric Model
We developed a dynamic model of expert ratings of
ICOs. Our model is dynamic because we account for
the fact that our y variable, namely, expert rating,
depends on its lagged values, i.e., mean of aggregate
ratings from previous periods. Such state-dependence
is important to consider while studying outcomes that
build on an “accumulated stock” over time. Recent
examples of such phenomena studied using dynamic
models include mobile-user content consumption
(Ghose and Han 2011), sales (Li and Wu 2018),
project output (Aral, Brynjolfsson and Van Alstyne
2012), YouTube video views (Yoganarasimhan
2012), and firm sales (Sonier, McAlister and Rutz
2011). Our empirical specification is presented in the
following model, where
ି


 =  + ࢻ (  ) + ࢼ + ࢾ + ࢿ

ୀ

Yij denotes the expert j’s rating for project i, Yij-1is the
lagged average of the dependent variable, i.e.,
average rating by all experts before expert j for
project i, Xi is a vector of project-specific expertinvariant covariates. It includes our explanatory
variable, agent rating. In addition, it also has all the
control variables, namely, Preico, Price,
DistributedInICO, Softcap and Hardcap, andߜ
ߜI is an
expert-invariant unobserved project fixed effect. It
captures other inherent characteristics of the ICO. εij

is the idiosyncratic error term that captures random
shocks to the ICO evaluations.
5.3. Estimation Strategy
The dynamic model used here for panel data
analysis is System General Method of Moments
(GMM) and this enables the explanatory variables to
be treated as potentially endogenous. It is not difficult
to see that most of our expert-varying variables Xi in
this analysis can be potentially endogenous and can
be correlated with ICOs’ fixed or expert-varying
unobserved factors. An initial remedy to this issue
might be to use the fixed-effect models. However,
Nickell (1981) show that in a dynamic setting with
finite T, fixed-effect estimators are inconsistent. To
resolve this issue, a method of using instrumental
variables (IVs) is suggested by Anderson and Hsiao
(1981) and further developed by Arellano and Bond
(1991). Their method which is also called “difference
GMM,” is suitable for “small T, large N” panels.
Assuming that εij’s are iid across I and j, the
Arellano-Bond estimation starts by transforming all
regressors, usually by “first-differences” or “forward
orthogonal deviations” to eliminate fixed effect ηi.
Then they show that longer lags of the regressors can
be used as valid instruments, and applying the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) provides a
consistent and efficient estimator. However, Blundell
and Bond (1998) show that in dynamic panel models
where the autoregressive parameter (α) is moderately
large and the number of time series observations is
moderately small, the Arellano-Bond IVs (past levels
of the regressors) convey little information about the
transformed regressors (future changes) and therefore
the weak instruments make the Arellano-Bond
estimator perform poorly. By assuming an initial
condition, Blundell and Bond (1998) shows that in a
level (untransformed) equation one can use
transformed regressors as valid instruments
orthogonal to the fixed effects. Adding the new
moment conditions to the set of Arellano-Bond
moment conditions, they designed an efficient
“system GMM” estimator that performs better than
“difference GMM.” To run the system GMM model,
we use xtabond2, a stata command written by
Roodman (2006). With this command we use a twostep option to make analysis robust to
heteroscedasticity. Further, we use the robust option
to apply the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample
correction to fix the downward bias of the system
GMM standard errors. Roodman (2009) pointed out
that too many instruments in system GMM models
can result in over-fitting the endogenous variables.
Therefore, we use the collapse option which creates
one instrument for each variable and lag distance,
rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag
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distance. This approach in small samples can avoid
the bias due to the rising number of instruments.
Finally, we add the orthogonal option which requests
the forward-orthogonal-deviations transformation
instead of first differencing. We examine and show
the validity of the group of IVs by using Hansen test
and we have also recorded the AR (2) p-value to
further validate our results and implied consistency
across all the models.
5.4. Model Specifications
Model 1 is our baseline model. We run the model
described above on the entire data set (Sample 1 in
Figure X). For models 2 and 3, we use the same
specification but run the models on different sub
samples. In Model 2, we examine only instances
where agent rating is low and in Model 3, only those
observations where the agent rating is high (Sample
3). While it might seem like an option to do an
interaction analysis instead of sub-sample analysis,
note that we are examining the effect of only one
independent variable, AI Agent Rating, for low and
high values of the same variable.
We classify agent ratings greater than 4.3 as “high”
and the rest as “low”. The rationale for this choice is
as follows. In our sample, 15% of all projects were
successful (following prior literature(Amsden and
Schweizer 2018; Momtaz 2020),we classify a project
as successful if the ICO token is trading at a non-zero
value one year after the ICO). Hence based on the
agent rating distribution, we choose the top
15thpercentile (i.e. 4.3 and above) of the AI agent
ratings as the cut off for successful rating. We repeat
our analysis with different thresholds (4.0 and 4.6)
and find that our results remain qualitatively
consistent throughout.
5.5. Results
In Model 1 we estimate the effect of agent rating on
expert rating using GMM estimation, controlling for
lagged expert rating, preICO, Price in ICO,
Distributed in ICO, softcap, hardcap and success.
We see agent rating has a positive and statistically
significant effect on expert rating (0.473, p<0.01).
In model 2, which is the sample with low agent
ratings, we observe that the agent ratings have a
positive and statistically significant effect on expert
rating (1.136, p<0.01). This shows that when AI
agent rates a project low, experts are likely to be
aligning with the agent.
However, in model 3, which is the sample with high
agent ratings, we do not find a statistically significant
effect of the agent rating on expert ratings (p=0.322).
This shows that when the agent is positive about the
likelihood of success of an ICO, experts are possibly

more cautious and wary of aligning with the agent’s
assessment.
In our main analysis, we choose 4.3 as the cut off
because it is representative of the success likelihood
in our sample.
Table 3. System GMM Estimation of the
Effect of Agent Ratings on Expert Ratings

Agent Rating
Lagged Rating
Pre ICO
Price in ICO
Distributed in
ICO
Softcap
Hardcap
Success
Intercept
No. of
Observations
AR(2) p-value

M1:
Full Sample

M2:
Agent Low

M3:
Agent High

0.4727*
(0.2826)
0.2747
(0.3473)
-0.1197
(0.2903)
-1.1948
(1.0552)
0.2049
(0.8876)
0.2309
(0.2007)
-0.2215
(0.3082)
0.3246
(0.6183)
1.2699
(1.7895)
9339

1.1356***
(0.4306)
0.3521
(0.3133)
-0.3517
(0.4389)
-1.2546
(1.0264)
-0.9296
(0.7861)
0.2478
(0.1884)
-0.2247
(0.3064)
0.3667
(0.5539)
-0.6952
(1.2453)
6891

-2.0199
(2.0393)
-0.2803
(0.5315)
0.4114
(0.4715)
3.4311
(4.1724)
0.3646
(0.8203)
-0.4635
(6.4826)
-0.3255
(0.3164)
-0.1501
(0.8189)
14.3155
(10.3179)
2448

0.464

0.570

0.700

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

5.6. Robustness Checks
In order to verify the robustness of our results, we
alter the threshold for “high rating” by the bot. In our
main analysis, we choose 4.3 as the cut off because it
is representative of the success likelihood in our
sample. Adopting this procedure helps us to prove the
trends remain consistent over a considerable range
showing that the relation between humans and the AI
agent hold generally. Using 4.0 and 4.6 as the
benchmark agent ratings, we found that the results
are qualitatively similar to the main models. We
found that in both models, the AI rating has
statistically significant effect on expert ratings for
samples 1 (full sample), 2 (AI rates low), but not in
model 3 (AI rates high). We also used three different
dependent variables. We used the individual ratings
provided by the Human Experts on each category of
Team, Vision and Product (instead of the aggregate
rating, which we used in our main analysis). Here, we
show that even for each of the category-wise ratings,
the results are qualitatively similar.
Due to space constraints, we do not present these
results.
5.7. Evaluating Human and AI Performances
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To test hypothesis 4, we perform the following
analysis to compare human experts and AI agent’s
performances. Based on the confusion matrix, we
calculate the precision, recall, F score, as well as
sensitivity and specificity for both AI and human
experts. We also plot the ROC curve to compare the
performances of AI and human experts.
Although the AI agent has a high accuracy than
human experts, we need to consider the context of the
analyses. The fact that more than 80% of ICOs have
historically failed, means that an AI agent which
always predicts failure will be correct more than 80%
of the time. In such situations, the two more
meaningful model evaluation metrics are Precision
and Recall. In our case, Precision indicates what
proportion of ICOs rated as high quality actually
succeeds. On the other hand, Recall indicates the
percentage of total successful projects that are
correctly rated high. The F1-score is a harmonic
mean of the precision and recall which balances the
use of precision and recall to measure performance.
Human experts have higher precision, recall, and F1
score, and thus outperform the AI agent.

Figure 4. ROC/ AUC Curve for Human and AI
Agents
In addition, we also evaluated the sensitivity and
specificity of human experts and the AI agent.
Sensitivity indicates what proportion of the positive
class is correctly classified, i.e. what proportion of
successful ICOs is correctly predicted. Specificity
indicates what proportion of the negative class are
correctly classified, i.e. how accurate human and AI
are in predicting the failed ICOs. These two metrics
are graphically represented using a Receiver Operator
Characteristic (ROC) curve for an easier
understanding of the prediction performances. The
ROC curve is a probability curve that plots the True
Positive Rate against False Positive Rate at various
threshold values. TPR is same as sensitivity/recall
while FPR is (1-specificity) or the proportion of the
negative class that got incorrectly classified. The

Area Under the Curve (AUC) is the measure of the
ability of a classifier to distinguish between classes
and is used as a summary of the ROC curve. The
higher the AUC value the better is the prediction
performance. Based on ROC/AUC analysis, we can
see that the agent performs about at the level of
random chance, and the human experts perform only
slightly better.

6. Discussion
Our study provides useful findings on human
behaviors in settings where humans perform a
complex task incorporating advice from an AI agent.
We find that humans’ ratings of initial coin offerings
outperformed the ratings of the AI agent alone, and
strike a better balance between precision and recall.
We noted that neither the human experts nor the
agent had very good performance in our particular
context. Human ratings were influenced by the
ratings given by the AI agent, but in an asymmetrical
manner. In our context, 80% of the projects failed, so
as we theorized, human experts’ decisions were
aligned with that of the AI agent’s when the agent
rated a project low, but were not aligned when the
agent rated a project high. Thus, we conclude that
most experts used the agent’s assessments to screen
out projects and usually concurred with the agent
when it gave low ratings. When an agent gave high
ratings to a project, the human experts focused more
carefully on it, and made judgments independent of
the agent’s assessment. In other words, a high agent
rating triggered experts to apply their own judgment,
which was not materially influenced by the agent’s
ratings. We suggest that in high risk contexts, AI
poses an asymmetric anchoring impact on humans.
There are several reasons for the asymmetric
anchoring we observe. First, predicting success is a
much riskier bet than predicting failure in the ICO
market with its high failure rate. Second, it is possible
that the humans are using the agent as a filter or a
first check. When the agent rates low, humans
interpret that as the project not even meeting a
threshold and may not give it full consideration. But,
when the agent rates high, it passes the first check,
and experts give these projects due attention, after
which they agree or disagree with the agent.
The tendency of human experts to align their
ratings with those of the AI agent has to do with the
nature of the task at hand. The true potential of an
ICO is extremely difficult to evaluate, and when
faced with such problems that are highly complex
and uncertain in nature, it is likely that humans lean
on objective signals. It is important for the designers
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of human – AI hybrid systems and platforms to bear
this in mind and carefully consider when, whether,
and to whom the work of the agent should be made
visible.
We use three different measures of prediction
quality to compare the performances of the agent and
the human and to analyze if adding a human to the
mix adds value. Overall, the AI agent has a higher
accuracy than the human in its predictions, but this is
largely driven by the fact the agent is more
conservative in its assessments. We then find that
humans perform better at both precision and recall,
thus a higher F1 score overall. Humans are also better
at distinguishing between the two classes, namely
high-quality and low-quality projects, as depicted in
the ROC curve in Figure 4.
Our study has several limitations. First, we use
whether the ICO token is trading at a non-zero value
one year after the ICO as the measure for success.
We choose this measure based on prior research
(Amsden and Schweizer 2018; Momtaz 2020) but we
recognize that success is multi-dimensional and there
are several other ways to measure it. Second, our
understanding of Benchy, the platform agent’s
algorithm is limited. While we are aware of some of
the inputs to the algorithm based on the information
on icobench.com, we don’t know the details of the
algorithm, and are unable to factor it into our
analysis. Finally, we acknowledge the limitation on
the generalizability of our results which like all
empirical results are contingent on the characteristics
of the problem at hand, the context, and the market
we examine.
We believe the findings offer three implications
for theory and future research. First, our results show
that in this form of human-AI partnership, human
experts rely on the AI agent to screen out projects
and focus their attention on projects the AI has rated
highly. Our findings are influenced by our research
context which is characterized by (a) the complexity
of the task at hand (b) the volatile nature of ICOs and
the risks involved, (c) the skewness of the outcomes
– the algorithm is used to identify rare events, and
(d) the sequential nature of task completion (the AI
agent completes the task first and the human experts
use the AI agent’s assessment in their own
judgment). Future research can verify this finding in
similar contexts, such as diagnose of rare diseases,
and identifying investment opportunities.
Second, our study opens avenues for future
research on the human–AI partnership. It is wellknown that human bias can creep into algorithms
(Chan and Wang 2017, Dastin 2018), and humans
exhibit bias for or against AI algorithms (Dietvorst et
al. 2015, Luo et. al 2019, Al-Natour et al. 2006,

Benbasat and Wang 2005). Adopting prospect theory
into human AI interaction context, our study shows
how humans weigh positive and negative AI
recommendations differently due to risk aversion
tendencies. This brings up interesting questions,
when designing AI augmented systems, should we
take human cognitive biases into consideration? How
to best design systems for different contexts?
Third, our study builds on research in the human
and Decision Support Systems interaction area and
investigates human behavior when interacting with
Intelligent Decision Support Systems. Unlike prior
research suggests AI algorithm appreciation or
aversion in different contexts, our study finds an
asymmetric anchoring effect of the AI agents on
human in contexts with high risk and uncertainty.
Our findings also have three implications for
users and designers of human–AI hybrid systems.
First, system designers need to carefully contemplate
on the desired roles of the agent and the human. How
important is the independence of human judgment in
the context? Is the intended role of the agent that of
an assistant that makes the human’s job easier via a
preliminary pre-screening analysis? Or are the agent
and human meant to act as independent,
complementary undertakers of the task, given the
comparative strengths of AI agents and humans?
Depending on the intended role, system designers
need to decide whether to expose the human to the
work product of the agent.
Second, if humans are inclined to use the AI
agent as a filter for screening, there may be value in
designing AI agents that do just that. In other words,
instead of aiming to have the AI do the same job as
the human, we could potentially get better results if
we focused on creating AI agents that weed out
distinctly poor prospects and create shortlists for
humans to examine carefully.
Finally, our study shows that we cannot put
humans and AI together to solve complex problems
and expect superior performance to naturally emerge.
From a team-building perspective, just as we train
team members of complementary strengths to work
with each other effectively, in a world with
increasing integration between human and artificial
intelligences, we see the need for the deliberate and
systematic training of humans to work effectively
alongside AI counterparts.
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